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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 100 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 22/05/1997 




Primary cause: Unavoidable (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: POMZ AP frag Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
ditch/channel/trench 
soft 
Date record created: 24/01/2004 Date  last modified: 24/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 





At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available. The 
following summarises its content.  
The victim had been a deminer for five years. It was seven months since his last revision 
course and 24 days since his last leave. The accident occurred in an area described as 
agricultural – a "grapes field". A photograph showed that the accident occurred in a gully [a 
collapsed irrigation channel?] on ground that had light scrubby bush but no vines in evidence. 
The investigators determined that the minefield was old and the mines had fallen and become 
buried. The victim did not mark the detector reading point before investigating with a pick, so 
triggered the mine which was identified as a POMZ from "fragments found". The victim's pick 
and helmet were damaged. 
The Assistant Team Leader said that the victim marked the detector reading and triggered 
the mine when he reached the second mark (centre of three stones) with the pick. He said the 
deminer should have been using a bayonet rather than the pick in soft ground. 
The victim's partner said that the victim marked the detector reading and triggered the mine 
when he reached the second mark (centre of three stones) with the pick. He said he was 
doing his job properly. He said they should not be allowed to use the pick in soft ground. 
The victim said that he marked the detector reading and the mine went off as he reached the 
second point. 
The Section Leader said that the deminer did not mark properly and his carelessness 




The investigators concluded that the victim breached technical and safety procedures by 
using the pick in an area where it is not needed, then using the pick improperly having not 
marked the detector reading point. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the Section Leader should be disciplined for poor 
management, that no one should be allowed to investigate the detector "reading point" with a 




Victim number: 133 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: 6,429 Rs Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 











See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
The victim's injuries were summarised as superficial injuries to his left arm, left hand and left 
side of his chest.  
There were two medic's sketches on file, one showing no injury to his hand. The other sketch 
is reproduced below.   
 
A site-medical report added superficial neck injuries to the record. A more detailed report 
mentioned finger injuries. 
The demining group reported that the victim suffered superficial injuries to his chest and neck 
and left arm and left hand. The insurers were informed on 23rd May 1997 that the victim had 
sustained injuries to the left side of his neck, his chest, arm and fingers.  
Compensation of 6,429 Rs was paid on 13th August 1997. 
  
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Unavoidable" because, despite the 
investigator's opinion, there was no evidence to suggest that the victim had not been working 
in the way in which he was trained. There is some question over whether the method of 
excavation was appropriate, and the methods used are determined by senior management. In 
deference to the investigators, the secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” 
because the victim may have been working inappropriately and his error not corrected. 
The general agreement that the mine detonated on the second marker may indicate that the 
detector signal had not been marked accurately. But this may have been due to the 
inadequacy of the detector, as recorded in the reports of many other Afghan accidents around 
this time (when the Schiebel AN/19 was still in use). 
3 
The use of a pick and a squatting position to "excavate" were both in breach of UN 
requirements, but not in breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those 
requirements.  The failure of the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the 
SOPs for local conditions, or enforce their own standards may be seen as a management 
failing.  
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
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